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We present a novel method for generating symbolic adversarial examples: input regions guaranteed to only
contain adversarial examples for the given neural network. ese regions can generate real-world adversarial
examples as they summarize trillions of adversarial examples.
We theoretically show that computing optimal symbolic adversarial examples is computationally expensive.
We present a method for approximating optimal examples in a scalable manner. Our method rst selectively
uses adversarial aacks to generate a candidate region and then prunes this region with hyperplanes that
t points obtained via specialized sampling. It iterates until arriving at a symbolic adversarial example for
which it can prove, via state-of-the-art convex relaxation techniques, that the region only contains adversarial
examples. Our experimental results demonstrate that our method is practically eective: it only needs a few
thousand aacks to infer symbolic summaries guaranteed to contain ≈ 10258 adversarial examples.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Adversarial Examples, Verication, Machine Learning, Abstract Interpre-
tation, Neural Networks
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks were recently shown to be vulnerable to adversarial aacks: small input
perturbations causing the network to misclassify (Szegedy et al. 2013). is has caused an increased
interest in designing powerful aacks (Andriushchenko et al. 2019; Athalye et al. 2018; Carlini
and Wagner 2017; Croce and Hein 2019; Dong et al. 2018; Goodfellow et al. 2015; Gowal et al.
2019; Madry et al. 2018; Trame`r et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2019; Xiao et al. 2018; Zheng et al. 2019)
for generating adversarial examples. However, the practical relevance of these examples remains
unclear. is is because these models assume that the examples can be directly supplied to the
neural networks. It can happen that these examples when reconstructed in the real-world and
observed through a camera are no longer adversarial.
To have any practical utility, adversarial examples need to be robust (Athalye et al. 2018), meaning
they should be invariant to changes in the environment such as variations in lighting conditions,
or noise in camera perception. Robust examples are therefore more likely to be reproducible in real-
world conditions than non-robust ones. One way of demonstrating robustness is by creating large
continuous regions containing only adversarial examples. antifying the number of examples in
the continuous region provides a measure of the degree of robustness of the generated examples.
Continuous regions have other applications beyond robustness: for explaining the source of
adversarial examples, e.g., whether certain pixels in an image contribute more to the examples
(Ilyas et al. 2019), for runtime monitoring of adversarial examples (Grosse et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2020;
Lu et al. 2017), or for training more robust models (Madry et al. 2018). Ideally, we would like to
obtain a symbolic summary capturing a set of adversarial examples. e existing approaches for
generating adversarial examples are inherently not suitable for generating such summaries. is is
because they provide only a single concrete adversarial example as output. Running these aacks
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Fig. 1. Symbolic adversarial example for an MNIST convolutional network with 6 layers and 48K neurons. All
images in our region are classified as 3 by the network instead of 5.
multiple times can generate several examples, but the obtained examples may not be continuous or
they might be too dissimilar. is reduces their suitability for the above applications.
is Work: Symbolic Adversarial Examples. In this work, we tackle the above limitation of
existing approaches by presenting the concept of a symbolic adversarial example – a convex shape
that captures a very large set (e.g., > 10100) of concrete adversarial examples. Our set is robust
and captures several variations to the original example such as pixel intensity variations due to
changes in lighting or noise in camera perception. It is infeasible to obtain such regions via direct
enumeration of concrete adversarial examples. We theoretically show in Section 2 that generating
optimal symbolic adversarial examples (in terms of volume) is a hard problem. We present a novel
scalable method for inferring approximations of the optimal symbolic adversarial examples in
Section 6.
Figure 1 shows an example symbolic region containing 10144 adversarial images produced by
our method for a large MNIST convolutional network with 6 layers and 48K neurons. e original
image is of digit 5, and all images in our region are classied as 3 by the network. e colorbar on
the right-hand side of Figure 1 quanties the number of values each pixel can take in our inferred
region. e yellow and violet colors represent the two extremes. e intensity of the yellow-colored
pixels can vary the most, thus these pixels contribute to more adversarial examples. e intensity of
the purple-colored varies the least, thus the adversarial examples in our region are sensitive to the
intensity values of these pixels. In our region, the intensity of most background pixels on the edges
of the image can vary a lot, as these are green. Violet and green color are more evenly distributed
among pixels closer to the foreground (part of the digit ”5”). Further, the intensity of several pixels
in the foreground can also vary signicantly. We note that all yellow pixels occur in the foreground.
In summary, our region can capture examples that can be generated by signicant variations in the
intensities of several background and foreground pixels when transferring synthesized examples
from existing aacks to real-world conditions.
Another application of our set is its use in systems for real-time monitoring of adversarial
examples. Here, any image observed to be within our region can be agged as adversarial and
an appropriate action taken to deal with such examples. We note that our symbolic regions are
fundamentally dierent from saliency maps (Etmann et al. 2019; Sahoo et al. 2020) as the laer
identies pixels important for classication but cannot capture robust adversarial examples.
Our method is non-trivial: we rst collect several isolated adversarial examples using existing
aacks and then extrapolate them to obtain a large convex region, possibly containing spurious
adversarial examples. We then generate samples containing both correctly-classied points and
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Fig. 2. An example neural network decision boundary in the 2D seing (in blue). The green subregion
represents a polyhedral underapproximation P ⊆ Ac .
adversarial examples based on Frank-Wolfe optimization (Frank and Wolfe 1956) and linear pro-
gramming. We then remove spurious adversarial examples from our extrapolated region by cuing
it with linear classiers learned from the sampled points. e cuing is applied iteratively until we
can certify that the region contains only the adversarial examples.
Main Contributions. Our key contributions are:
• e concept of a symbolic adversarial example – a convex region containing a large set of
concrete adversarial examples that can be used for creating real-world examples.
• A novel scalable method for generating symbolic adversarial examples, combining spe-
cialized sampling, hyperplane cuing, shrinking of spurious regions and state-of-the-art
neural network certication techniques.
• A complete end-to-end implementation of our method and a thorough experimental eval-
uation demonstrating that it can generate symbolic examples containing 10265 concrete
adversarial examples on a CIFAR10 convolutional network, within 5 minutes on average.
2 HARDNESS OF GENERATING SYMBOLIC ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Neural networks are oen applied to high-dimensional input domains, such as images and audio,
which are particularly vulnerable to adversarial examples, as demonstrated by Gilmer et al. (2018);
Khoury and Hadeld-Menell (2018). erefore, it is crucial that algorithms for creating symbolic
adversarial regions scale to high-dimensional inputs. In this work, we focus on a family of algorithms
that compute symbolic regions via a greedy approach. Our experimental observations in Section 7
conrm that such algorithms are more scalable and precise than other known alternatives (Gopinath
et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2018) that generate regions by enumerating all paths in the network which are
exponential in the number of neurons for ReLU based networks considered in our work. Combining
these regions for producing a single convex symbolic region again has exponential complexity in
the number of input dimensions. In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis of the complexity
of greedily generating optimal (in terms of volume) polyhedral symbolic adversarial examples. Our
analysis shows that this has exponential complexity in the number of input dimensions.
Let C be the set of all binary classiers with continuous decision boundaries that assign labels
from {−1, 1} to a connected subspace I of Rd . Note that all neural networks with continuous
activation functions are in C. Let f ∈ C be a ground-truth binary classier which we want to
approximate using a learning algorithm. e algorithm creates an approximation c ∈ C of f
based on a nite dataset of training samples D = {(xi , f (xi ))}i=1, ...,m . Here, the xi ’s are drawn
from an unknown input probability distribution P on I. To simplify analysis, we assume that the
approximate classier c correctly classies all the points in D.
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We call the regionAc = {x ∈ I | c(x) , f (x)} the adversarial region of c . We note thatAc does
not contain any points fromD. Ac is usually a disjoint union of connected regions (instead of being
a single connected region). Figure 2 showsAc (in blue) for a ReLU based neural network. e green
region in the gure represents a polyhedral approximation P ⊆ Ac . Since P is a polyhedron, it
must be contained entirely within one of the connected subregions ofAc . Note that the algorithms
developed in this paper can be applied to generate multiple regions P for each subregion of Ac .
However, this is generally computationally prohibitive for neural networks, where many such
regions exist. To simplify notation, we use Ac to refer to the connected subregion containing P
for the remainder of this section.
Our algorithms create P iteratively by cuing volume away from I until P ⊆ Ac . i.e., we
generate a sequence of polyhedra {Pi }i=0, ...,m where P0 = I and P = Pm ⊆ Ac . Each polyhedron
in the sequence is created from the previous one by intersecting it with an additional half-space
constraint hi : aix + bi ≤ 0 with parameters ai ∈ Rd ,bi ∈ R. e linear classier hi is estimated
from a separate dataset Di , sampled using the input distribution P and evaluated using f . In order
to t the linear classiers hi we require each dataset Di to contain both positive samples (x such
that f (x) , c(x)) and negative samples (x such that f (x) = c(x)).
A positive sample x is correctly classied by hi if aix + bi ≤ 0 — that is, hi keeps it in Pi ,
and incorrectly classied otherwise. Similarly, a negative sample x is correctly classied by hi if
aix + bi ≥ 0 — that is, hi removes it from Pi , and incorrectly classied otherwise. To simplify
notations, we assume that samples x , for which aix + bi = 0 can be regarded as both correctly
classied and missclassied. We use the volume ratio vol(P)vol(Ac ) to quantify the eectiveness of our
algorithms.
For the remainder of this section, we focus on analyzing the aforementioned family of algorithms
under a simplied seing to intuitively demonstrate the inherent hardness of computing symbolic
adversarial examples and thereby motivating the need for the methods developed in this paper. We
will show that our problem is hard even in this simplied seing; in the more general seing, our
problem may be even harder.
We choose a seing where we have an analytic characterization of the decision boundary learned
by the model and thus an explicit formula for vol(Ac ). We choose Ac to be a d-dimensional
hyperbox [0,σ ]d for some σ ∈ (0, 1) with d decision boundaries. e i th decision boundary of our
chosenAc is abesti ·x+bbesti = 0 with abesti = ei and bbesti = −σ for all input dimensions i ∈ {1, . . . ,d},
where ei is the i th unit vector. We further assume that I = [0, 1]d and that points in Di used for
learning hi are sampled from the uniform distribution on I.
We require that for each hyperplane hi , the fraction of volume removed from Ac by hi is not
more than a chosen v ∈ [0, 1], i.e., we have vol(hi∩Ac )vol(Ac ) ≥ v . To ensure this, we enforce that for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the classier associated with hi picks its slope parameters ai close to abestκ(i) for
some input dimension κ(i) ∈ {1, . . . ,d}. We quantify the distance between ai and abestκ(i) in terms
of the cosine similarity ωi =
〈ai ,abestκ (i ) 〉
‖ai ‖2 ‖abestκ (i ) ‖2
. To enforce the closeness, we assume the existence of a
chosen lower bound ωmin ∈ (0, 1] such that ωi ≥ ωmin for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. A possible geometric
interpretation of these assumptions is that all classiers are given imprecise information on abesti —
the true slopes of the decision boundaries ofAc , in terms of a maximal error angle α = arccos (ωmin)
between them and ei , but no information about the biases bbesti . is is demonstrated in the 2D
seing in Figure 3(a).
We formally dene the maximal width cut in the k(i)th dimension ofAc by a half-space constraint
hi , as the solution of the optimization problem max
x ∈Ac
σ − x[κ(i)], such that x is missclassied by
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Fig. 3. Illustrations of the proofs in Section 2. In both subfigures, the blue box represents the input space
hyperbox I, the red box represents Ac and the orange shaded region represents the volume from which we
sample p. Additionally, in both subfigures, we represent the rest of the positive and negative samples in Di
with green pluses and red minuses, respectively. In (a), the angle α represents the maximum allowed angle
between the normals of hi and the decision boundary of Ac . The blue dot represents the point with the
worst possible horizontal error xmini when a point is sampled in the orange region. . In (b), the green box
represents the region Pi to which hi+1 is added.
hi . We denote the value of x for which the maximum is achieved xmini . Next, we aim to analyze
and quantify how the uncertainty in ai and bi aects the volume cut from Ac by the classier hi .
To this end, we introduce separate error terms δi and ϵi for the maximal width cut in the κ(i)th
dimension by deviations in ai and bi from the optimal abestκ(i) and b
best
κ(i) , respectively.
To nd the worst-case width δi , we search for pairs of points (p1,p2), such that p1,p2 ∈ Ac and
the property that p2 is correctly classied and p1 is not. Intuitively, as p1[κ(i)] approaches 0 and
p2[κ(i)] approaches σ , the slope ai goes further and further away from the optimal ei . Since, the
cosine similarity between these vectors is lower-bounded, there exists pmin1 and pmax2 such that
pmax2 [κ(i)] − pmin1 [κ(i)] is maximal. One can look at this dierence as the maximum width allowed
to be additionally cut in the κ(i)th dimension, given that we have ensured some pmax2 close to the
decision boundary is correctly classied. Following this intuition, we formally dene:
δi = maximize
p1,p2 ∈ Ac , ai ∈ Rd , bi ∈ R
p2[κ(i)] − p1[κ(i)]
subject to ai · p1 + bi ≥ 0,
ai · p2 + bi ≤ 0,
ωi ≥ ωmin.
(1)
e next lemma shows that the optimization problem dened by Equation 1 is independent of bi ,
as required by our intuitive denition of δi , and provides its analytical solution:
Lemma 2.1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, δi is given by the formula δi = σ
√
(d−1)·(1−ω2min)
ωmin
and therefore
independent of bi .
Proof. Let (pmin1 ,pmax2 ,amaxi ,bmaxi ) be an assignment of values to p1, p2, ai and bi , respectively,
that together maximize δi . en, the assignment (pmin1 +c ·eκ(i),pmax2 +c ·eκ(i),amaxi ,bmaxi −c ·amaxi [κ(i)])
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also maximizes δi for all c ∈ R — that is, the problem is translation invariant in the κ(i)th dimension.
Additionally, the hyperplane ai · x + bi = 0 passes through the points pmin1 and pmax2 that maximize
δi , since otherwise one can choose smaller p1[κ(i)] and bigger p2[κ(i)] until they do, while also
improving the objective. erefore, we can reformulate Equation 1 in the equivalent form:
δi = maximize
p1,p2 ∈ Ac , ai ∈ Rd
p2[κ(i)] − p1[κ(i)]
subject to ai · (p2 − p1) = 0,
ai [κ(i)] ≥ ωmin,
‖ai ‖2 = 1,
(2)
where the last two constraints come from the denition of ωmin. We can rewrite ai · (p2 −p1) = 0 as
p2[κ(i)] − p1[κ(i)] =
∑
j ∈{1, ...,d }\{κ(i)} ai [j] · (p1[j] − p2[j])
ai [κ(i)] .
Since p1,p2 ∈ Ac , we know p1[j] − p2[j] ≤ σ for all input dimensions j ∈ {1, . . . ,d} \ {κ(i)}.
e bound is tight and can be achieved for p1[j] = σ and p2[j] = 0, for all input dimensions
j ∈ {1, . . . ,d} \ {κ(i)} independently. Seing S = ∑j ∈{1, ...,d }\{κ(i)} ai [j], we can rewrite Equation 2
as follows:
δi = maximize
ai ∈ Rd
S · σ
ai [κ(i)]
subject to ai [κ(i)] ≥ ωmin,
‖ai ‖2 = 1
(3)
One can use Lagrangian multipliers to demonstrate that under the conditions in Equation 3, S is
maximized when ai [κ(i)] = ωmin and all other dimension of ai are equal to
√
1−ω2min
d−1 . erefore, δi
is also maximized under the same conditions and it is given by the formula given in Lemma 2.1. 
Lemma 2.1 demonstrates that δi is independent of i . For the rest of this section, we refer to its
value as simply δ to simplify the notation.
Let ϵi be the worst-case width cut from the κ(i)th dimension of Ac , for the simple case when ai
is optimal (ωmin = 1). Since hi correctly classies all samples in Di , ϵi is given by:
ϵi = maximize
p ∈ Di
σ − p[κ(i)]
subject to p ∈ Ac .
(4)
Next, we show that the worst-case width cut, in the general case ωmin ≤ 1, is given by the sum
of δ and ϵi :
Lemma 2.2. e worst-case width cut from the κ(i)th dimension of Ac by the classier hi is given
by the sum of δ and ϵi .
Proof. Due to the translational invariance property, Equation 1’s solution remains the same
if we additionally require p2[κ(i)] = σ − ϵi . From Equation 1, we know p1[κ(i)] ≥ p2[κ(i)] − δi .
erefore, p1[κ(i)] ≥ σ − δi − ϵi . In other words, the minimal width that cannot be removed from
the κ(i)th dimension ofAc , provided p is correctly classied is σ −δi −ϵi . erefore, the worst-case
width that can be cut is at most δi + ϵi . is bound is tight, as the equality is achieved for the case,
where p has all of its coordinates except the κ(i)th equal to 0. 
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Next, we introduce Lemma 2.3, which quanties the expected number of samples needed in Di
to guarantee vol(hi∩Ac )vol(Ac ) ≥ v for a chosen v ∈ [0, σ−δσ ]. Note that v cannot be more than σ−δσ , as
we cannot guarantee to preserve more than σ − δ of the width in the κ(i)th dimension under any
ϵi ∈ [0,σ ] owing to the uncertainty in the estimation of slopes ai .
Lemma 2.3. For v ∈ [0, σ−δσ ] and i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the expected number of samples ns = E[|Di |]
until vol(hi∩Ac )vol(Ac ) ≥ v holds is ns = 1σd (1− δσ −v) in the worst case.
Proof. We look at the probability of a point p to be contained Di , such that p[κ(i)] ≥ σ − ϵ
for a given ϵ ∈ [0,σ ]. When such point exists, we know ϵi ≤ ϵ . at is, for a given ϵ ∈ [0,σ ], we
are interested in the probability of sampling a point in the hyperrectangle
∏d
i=1[si ,σ ] with si = 0
for all dimensions i ∈ {1, . . . ,d} \ {κ(i)} and sκ(i) = σ − ϵ . Since we sample Di from the uniform
distribution on I, the probability is given by the ratio of the volumes of I and the hyperrectangle,
which has volume σd−1ϵ . erefore, the probability of sampling p is σd−1ϵ and the expected number
of samples ns to get such point p, which is a geometrically distributed random variable, is 1σd−1ϵ .
From Lemma 2.2, we know that vol(hi∩Ac )vol(Ac ) ≥
σ−ϵi−δ
σ ≥ σ−ϵ−δσ , since at least σ − ϵ − δ portion of
the width of κ(i)th dimension ofAc cannot be removed by hi . erefore, if we choose ϵ = σ −δ −vσ ,
we can guarantee vol(hi∩Ac )vol(Ac ) ≥ v . Plugging our choice of ϵ we conclude that ns = 1σd (1− δσ −v) is the
worst-case expected number of points we need to sample to obtain hi , such that vol(hi∩Ac )vol(Ac ) ≥ v
holds.

Next, we generalize this result to the full region P:
Theorem 2.4. For all V ∈ [0,
(
σ−δ
σ
)m
] the expected number of samples ns = E[|Di |], such that
vol(P)
vol(Ac ) ≥ V holds is at most ns = 1σd (1− δσ −V 1m ) .
Proof. Applying Lemma 2.3 with v = V 1m for all half-space constraints in P and multiplying
the individual volume bounds together we obtain the required result. 
In the next theorem, we consider the even simpler seing of ωmin = 1 – that is the seing in
which our binary classiers only considers axis-aligned half-space constraints. We also assume the
datasets Di are collected uniformly at random from Pi . We demonstrate that ensuring that P’s
volume shrinks by certain amount becomes more dicult as P approaches Ac :
Denition 2.5. For all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} corresponding to the polyhedra sequence Pi , and all input
dimensions k ∈ {1, . . . ,d}, we call uki = maxx ∈Pi (x[k]) the upper bound of dimension k in Pi .
Theorem 2.6. For all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} corresponding to the polyhedra sequence Pi , for which
uκ(i+1)i > σ and for all v ∈ (0, 1], the expected number of samples ns = E[|Di+1 |] needed to create
hi+1 such that
uκ (i+1)i+1 −σ
uκ (i+1)i −σ
≤ v holds is ns = u
κ (i+1)
i
(uκ (i+1)i −σ )·v
. Here, the quantity u
κ (i+1)
i+1 −σ
uκ (i+1)i −σ
quanties the
shrinking in the κ(i + 1)th dimension in step i + 1.
Proof. We show a depiction of our proof of eorem 2.6 in the 2D seing in Figure 3(b). We
considerκ(i+1)th dimension ofAc (the horizontal dimension in Figure 3(b)). Similarly to Lemma 2.3,
we quantify the probability that there exists a negative sample p ∈ Dh such that its κ(i + 1)th
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dimension has a coordinate in [σ , (uκ(i+1)i − σ ) · v + σ ]. Figure 3(b) depicts the region of possible
locations for p as an orange rectangle. We know that if such point p exists, due to the assumption
hi+1 correctly classies all samples the condition
uκ (i+1)i+1 −σ
uκ (i+1)i −σ
≤ v holds. Since Di+1 is uniformly
sampled from Pi the probability of sampling such p is given by the ratio of the volumes of the
orange region and Pi . is probability is (u
κ (i+1)
i −σ )·v
uκ (i+1)i
. e number of samples need for p to exist is
geometrically distributed and its expectation is given by ns =
uκ (i+1)i
(uκ (i+1)i −σ )·v
. 
3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF OUR THEORETICAL RESULTS
We next discuss the impact of our theoretical results in the previous section on the design of our
algorithms. eorem 2.4 demonstrates that despite our simplifying assumptions it is computation-
ally expensive to create P for high values of d or V . It can also be seen that small inaccuracies
in the estimated half-space constraint slopes can lead to big portions of the volume being cut. In
particular, we see that the quantity (σ−δσ )m acts like an upper bound on the volume of Ac that can
be guaranteed to be kept. For example with d = m = 10, and a slope dierence of only up to 4°,
the upper bound on the volume guaranteed to be kept is V ≈ 0.9. For d =m = 100 and the same
upper bound on the volume, the maximum slope dierence allowed is only ≈ 0.12°. Last but not
least, we see that the algorithm is particularly sensitive to V especially in high dimensions – e.g.
for d =m = 100, σ = 0.8, σ−δσ = 1 increasing V from 0.9 to 0.95 doubles the number of samples
required at each iteration from ≈ 4.7 × 1012 to ≈ 9.6 × 1012. We further note that the above results
assume that there is an exact procedure to determine whether a given region is adversarial. Exact
veriers for neural networks do not scale on the sizes of networks considered in our experiments,
therefore we actually use inexact veriers in our algorithms for scalability which can make the
problem even harder. Overall, for the general case encountered in our experiments, where Ac can
be an arbitrary connected shape and inexact veriers are used, the complexity of sampling would
be at least as hard as our results.
Since computing optimal regions is computationally expensive, we use heuristics to preserve as
much of Ac as possible in our algorithms presented in Section 6. In eorem 2.4, ns is inversely
proportional to the quantity σd which suggests that the eort of constructing a precise P is less
when the volume of Ac is close to that of I. erefore, we start with an input region I such that
the ratio vol(Ac )vol(I) is not too low by estimating tight bounding boxes around Ac before initiating the
half-space generation portion of our algorithm (Section 6.1). As per eorem 2.4, the amount of
incorrectly removed volume grows with the angle between the hyperplane hi and the decision
boundary, our sampling procedure in Section 6.4 employs heuristics so this angle is small.
From eorem 2.6 for a constant v it follows that lim
uκ (i+1)i →σ
ns = ∞. erefore, with each new
half-space it becomes harder and harder for a general sampling algorithm to progress. Another way
to look at eorem 2.6 is that for a constant number of samples ns the guaranteed volume removed
from Pi goes to 0 as i → ∞. is theoretical prediction is consistent with what we observe in
practice, where our algorithm sometimes will take a lot of iterations to converge. In Section 6.6, we
propose a shrinking procedure to deal with this issue.
4 BACKGROUND
We now discuss necessary methods which we leverage in the remainder of the paper. In this paper,
we focus on ReLU based neural networks. We note that our concepts can also be extended to
networks with other activations such as sigmoid and tanh. We consider neural networks with l
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Fig. 4. Convex approximations for the ReLU function: (a) shows the triangle approximation (Ehlers 2017)
with the minimum area in the input-output plane, (b) and (c) show the two convex approximations used in
DeepPoly (Singh et al. 2019). In the figure, λi, j = ui, j/(ui, j − li, j ) and µi, j = −li, j · ui, j/(ui, j − li, j ).
layers fi of the form fi (x) = max(0,Ai · x + bi ) for i in {1, . . . , l − 1} and fl (x) = Al · x + bl . e
neural network f is the composition of those layers: f = fl ◦ · · · ◦ f0. If we denote by zai, j the input
to the j-th ReLU activation in layer i and by zri, j the corresponding ReLU output, we can represent
the neural network as the system of constraints
zai, j = [bi ]j +
ni−1∑
k=1
[Ai ]j,k · zri−1,k ,
zri, j = max(0, zai, j ).
Here, zr0, j describes the j-th input activation. We call the two types of constraints ane and ReLU
constraints, respectively. Let n0 be the number of inputs to the network, if our inputs zr0 are
points of a polyhedron P ⊆ Rn0 , an adversarial class yt has the highest score on all inputs in
P if min(zal,yt − zal,y ) > 0 for all y ∈ {1, . . . ,nl } \ {yt } with respect to all constraints. Note that
{1, . . . ,nl } \ {yt } includes the true class yc . Our goal in this paper will be to nd the polyhedron
P for which this is true.
Linear approximations of ReLU. As reasoning about neural network constraints directly is oen
intractable, given bounds li, j ≤ zai, j ≤ ui, j , the triangle approximation (Ehlers 2017) relaxes the
ReLU constraints such that all involved inequalities are linear:
zri, j ≥ zai, j , zri, j ≥ 0,
zri, j ≤ λi, j · zai, j + µi, j .
Figure 4 (a) visualizes the triangle approximation. Here, λi, j = ui, j/(ui, j − li, j ) and µi, j = −li, j ·
ui, j/(ui, j − li, j ) are selected such that this set of constraints describes the convex hull of the
constraints obtained from the two branches of ReLU {li, j ≤ zai, j ≤ ui, j , zai, j ≥ 0, zri, j = zai, j } and
{li, j ≤ zai, j ≤ ui, j , zai, j ≤ 0, zri, j = 0}, in the (zai, j , zri, j )-plane. We can obtain bounds li, j and ui, j by
optimizing each component of zai, j according to the previously determined constraints for layers
0, . . . , i .
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LP objective. If we replace the original ReLU constraints by their triangle approximation, the
value of min(zal,yt − zal,y ) can at most decrease. erefore, if it is still larger than 0 even with the
relaxed constraints, we know that this is also true with the original constraints. e DeepPoly
approximation (Singh et al. 2019) further relaxes the triangle approximation by keeping only one of
the lower bounds on each variable zri, j . It picks either zri, j ≥ zai, j or zri, j ≥ 0, whichever minimizes
the area of the resulting triangle in the (zai, j , zri, j )-plane. Figure 4 (b) and (c) show the two convex
relaxations used in DeepPoly. Both the triangle approximation and the DeepPoly approximation
lead to linear constraints that can be used as part of linear programming (LP) problems.
We call O(P) = min(zal,yt − zal,y ) where y ∈ {1, . . . ,nl } \ {yt } computed with respect to the
polyhedron P dening the set of inputs, ane network constraints and the linear relaxations of
the ReLU as the LP objective.
Frank-Wolfe optimization. In addition to LP, our approach also relies on the Frank-Wolfe optimiza-
tion algorithm (Frank and Wolfe 1956). e algorithm nds a series x1, . . . xk of approximations to
the solution of an optimization problem minx∈D f (x) for compact convex D. Here f is a convex,
dierentiable real-valued function. e approximations are related by xi+1 = xi + γi · (si − xi ),
where si = argmins∈D sT∇f (xi ) and γi ∈ [0, 1] is a step size that is determined by minimizing
f (xi + γi · (si − xi )).
5 OVERVIEW
We now provide an overview of our approach for generating symbolic adversarial regions. e
technical details are provided in Section 6. Our approach is based on the family of greedy algorithms
considered in Section 2, which generate a sequence of polyhedra {Pi }i=0, ...,m by sampling both
adversarial and non-adversarial examples. We refer to the laer as counterexamples. Figure 5
summarizes the main steps of our algorithm.
Concrete and abstract counterexamples. We dene two types of counterexamples: concrete and
abstract, represented as red crosses and black diamonds in Figure 5(b), respectively. Let us consider
the candidate regionPi generated aer the ith iteration of our algorithm. Concrete counterexamples
are points x ∈ Pi for which the expression [f (x)]yt − [f (x)]y evaluates to a negative number for
some class y ∈ {1, . . . ,nl } \ {yt }. In the case of binary classication, these are just examples that
are classied correctly.
Exact veriers (Katz et al. 2017; Tjeng et al. 2019) for verifying whether the region computed by
our algorithm contains only adversarial examples do not scale for the network sizes considered
in our experiments. erefore we use inexact veriers for scalability, which have false positives
meaning they may fail to verify the region Pi as adversarial even though it is adversarial. Abstract
counterexamples are points in Pi that are either concrete counterexamples or those that prevent
us from verifying (using our inexact verier) that the entire Pi contains only adversarial examples.
Formally, abstract counterexamples are points in Pi for which minimizing the expression zal,yt −zal,y ,
for some class y ∈ {1, . . . ,nl } \ {yt } with respect to Pi evaluates to a negative number using our
inexact verier. In this paper, we use either the triangle based LP verier (Ehlers 2017) or DeepPoly
(Singh et al. 2019) for verication. For the rest of the paper, we refer to either abstract or concrete
counterexamples just as counterexamples.
Our algorithm rst collects adversarial examples and computes an initial box region around
them (dashed blue square in Figure 5(a)). Next, the algorithm collects counterexamples, which it
uses alongside the initial adversarial examples to t a hyperplane (dashed black line in Figure 5(b)),
separating the two categories. Multiple hyperplanes hi are ed by collecting new counterexamples
for each hyperplane. e process stops when the candidate region bounded by these hyperplanes
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(a) Initial region estimation (b) Fiing a single hyperplane (c) Shrinking the nal region
Fig. 5. Overview of our algorithm. Green pluses are adversarial aacks, red crosses are concrete counterex-
amples and black diamonds are abstract counterexamples. The dashed blue box represents the initial region
and dashed black lines represent the hyperplanes fied by our algorithm. The violet and red regions in (c)
show the final region fied by our algorithm before and aer shrinking respectively.
is either proven, via standard neural network verication techniques, to contain only adversarial
examples, or alternatively, a predetermined maximal number of hyperplanes is reached. In the
laer case, the region is further shrunk until it is proven to contain only adversarial examples.
Figure 5(c) depicts the shrinking process by which the violet-shaded polygon is shrunk to obtain
the red-shaded polygon.
5.1 Computing an Initial Region
e computation of the initial box region P0 is based on collecting adversarial examples. In
principle, any algorithm that produces adversarial examples can be used. We use both the Frank-
Wolfe optimization algorithm outlined in Section 4, as well as standard PGD aacks (Madry et al.
2018). Having obtained these samples, we t a box around them. We do so by nding the minimum
and maximum of each input space coordinate for adversarial examples in the set, as shown by the
dashed blue box in Figure 5(a).
5.2 Hyperplane Fiing
To generate the hyperplanes hi that bound our symbolic adversarial region, we rely on ing
a linear classier on a dataset Di consisting of adversarial examples and counterexamples. To
compose the dataset, we use the adversarial examples obtained during the computation of the
initial box region and add to them counterexamples sampled individually for each hyperplane.
We consider the i th iteration of our algorithm. To sample counterexamples, we rst use an
optimization procedure to nd the worst-case counterexample x∗ ∈ Pi−1: a concrete counterex-
ample for which [f (x∗)]yt − [f (x∗)]{1, ...,nl }\{yt } is the smallest, or an abstract counterexample
for which zal,yt − zal, {1, ...,nl }\{yt } is minimized by the LP verier. We obtain concrete worst-case
counterexamples using the Frank-Wolfe optimization algorithm and abstract counterexamples
by simply solving the LP involved in the verication process. In Figure 5(b) we represent the
worst-case counterexample using a green circle.
Heuristic for generating samples. Next, our algorithm nds the point x+ within our current input
region Pi−1 that is furthest away from x∗. In Figure 5(b) that point is represented by a red circle.
Connecting those two points results in a vector that we use as a sampling direction. We take
equally-spaced points on this sampling direction, each of which we use as a center of a Gaussian
with a covariance matrix of type ρ2I . In Figure 5(b) those points are represented as blue circles. Each
ρ is determined separately using a binary search so that a large portion of samples obtained from
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the Gaussian are both within the input region, are counterexamples and ρ is as large as possible.
Finally, we use the counterexamples obtained from the Gaussians, alongside the original set of
adversarial examples, as a classication dataset. We use a linear classier to optimally separate the
two, similar to Garg et al. (2014).
Intuitively, our sampling approximates the following idealized counterexample sampling proce-
dure to reduce the angle between hi and the true decision boundary, which in turn, reduces the
amount of incorrectly removed volume (eorem 2.4): 1) Choose a vertex x∗ of Pi−1 with worst
verication objective, 2) choose sampling direction passing through x∗ and the center of Pi−1 and
3) for each point on the direction segment contained in Pi−1, create samples, as close as possible,
to the nearest decision boundary of the neural network.
Since computing the center ofPi−1 is computationally expensive, instead of the direction pointing
to the center of Pi−1, in our procedure we choose the direction with associated maximal L1 length
segment contained in Pi−1. We use binary search on the ρ of the Gaussians as a way to sample
points close to the nearest neural network decision boundary.
5.3 Fast Counterexample Evaluation
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д˜7 = 2,
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0
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д˜8 = 0,
д∗8 = −1〉
0
〈z9 = z7,
д˜9 = 2,
д∗9 = 3〉
〈z10 ≥ 0,
z10 ≥ x8,
z10 ≤ 0.5 · z8 + 1,
д˜10 = 1,
д∗10 = 0.5〉
〈z11 = z9 + z10 + 1,
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0
Fig. 6. Fast counterexample evaluation on a ReLU based fully-connected network with four layers. The values
д˜i approximate the worst-case neuron values of the candidate (0.5,−0.5). The values д∗ correspond to the
worst possible abstract counterexample (1,−1).
Determining a single hyperplane cut takes at least the time required to detect whether samples
coming from the Gaussians are counterexamples. To check whether a candidate sample is a concrete
counterexample, we simply evaluate the neural network on that candidate. However, to check
whether a candidate sample is an abstract counterexample, we have to solve the neural network’s
verication LP. Depending on the size of the neural network, this can be quite slow. To avoid this
issue, we soundly approximate the LP solution based on the information gathered while solving
the same LP for the worst-case abstract counterexample x∗.
Figure 6 demonstrates our approach. e gure depicts the LP encoding of a ReLU based fully-
connected neural network that uses the triangle approximation for ReLU activations. e network
has four layers — an input layer, two hidden layers, and an output layer. In this example, we are
trying to verify that the box region (z1, z2) ∈ [−1, 1]2 is adversarial. e correct class is z11 and the
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adversarial class is z12. erefore, when to check whether a candidate is an abstract counterexample,
the LP solver needs to check whether the objective z12 − z11 can aain negative values. Figure 6
demonstrates how the candidate x = (0.5,−0.5) is proved to be an abstract counterexample based
on the worst-case counterexample x∗ = (1,−1), obtained by exactly minimizing the LP objective
with respect to the input variables z1 and z2.
In Figure 6, we have denoted with д∗i the values the LP solver has assigned to the individual
neurons in order to obtain the optimal x∗. At each ReLU node, Figure 6 depicts the inequalities
generated by the triangle approximation (shown in Figure 4 (a)) for this node. Observe that, given
a ReLU input value, the triangle approximation simply gives three bounds on the corresponding
ReLU output value — two lower bounds and one upper bound. For example, given д∗8 = −1, the
lower bounds of z10 are 0 and −1 and the upper bound is 0.5. Also observe that the values assigned
by the optimizer to the ReLU neurons in Figure 6 always happen to be one of those three bounds.
Empirically, we have observed this is oen the case when optimizing LPs created using the triangle
approximation in our experiments, however there is no theoretical guarantee.
Based on this assumption, we compute, in a feedforward fashion, an approximation to the neuron
values of the candidate x that minimize the LP objective z12 − z11. We denote these neuron values
with д˜i . We start by computing д˜3 and д˜4. Since z3 = z1 + z2, we compute д˜3 = д˜1 + д˜2 = 0 and
similarly д˜4 = 1. Next, we need to compute д˜5 and д˜6. As discussed, given д˜3 and д˜4, the triangle
approximation forces д˜5 ∈ [0, 1] and д˜6 ∈ [1, 1.5]. We have д∗6 = 2, which is given by the lower
boundary z6 ≥ z4. In order to choose the value of д˜6 in [1, 1.5], which minimizes the LP objective,
we carry over the choice taken by the LP optimizer for the worst-case abstract adversarial example
to the candidate x and, therefore, we assign д˜6 = д˜4 = 1. Similarly, д˜5 = 1 is given by the neuron’s
upper boundary. Note that we have no guarantees that д˜6 = 1 will be an optimal assignment for the
LP when evaluated on x . However, we know that if we choose this value, the value of the objective
obtained this way will be an upper bound on the optimal (i.e., minimal) objective value for the
candidate. We continue this process and compute the values for д˜11 = 4 and д˜12 = 1.
Finally, we calculate the approximate objective д˜12− д˜11 = −3. Because the approximate objective
is negative, we are guaranteed that the optimal objective for x is also negative and thus the candidate
is an abstract counterexample. It is worth pointing out that the optimal objective is −3.5, which
is close to the value −3 obtained by our approximation. We also point out that in the rare cases
when д∗i is not assigned a boundary value, we can choose a value for д˜i as a linear interpolation
between the larger of the two lower bounds and the upper bound, using an interpolation coecient
derived from д∗i and its respective bounds. is does not change the essential properties of our
approximation.
5.4 Shrinking the Candidate Region
As shown in eorem 2.6, the amount of volume removed decreases with every iteration which
can slow down convergence. erefore if, aer generating the specied maximum number of
hyperplanes, we still fail to verify the candidate region, we perform a nal shrinking on it so to
accelerate convergence towards obtaining a symbolic adversarial example. In particular, we choose
a center — the component-wise median of the adversarial examples (a green circle in Figure 5(c)) —
and shrink the input region towards it. is is done by modifying the hyperplanes the algorithm
has already t, including those describing the original input box. If the original hyperplanes are
represented by the set of linear inequalitiesW x ≤ c, the shrinking algorithm seeks to choose a
new set of biases c∗ ≤ c. e algorithm chooses the components of c∗ in terms of a parameter
θ ∈ [0, 1], that linearly interpolates the hyperplanes between their original state and the state in
which they go through the center of shrinking. A binary search on θ is used to obtain the nal
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set of hyperplanes, where the change is minimal. Figure 5(c) shows a generated region before and
aer shrinking and illustrates how positions of dierent hyperplanes change.
e chosen shrinking method preserves the shape of the region, as the hyperplanes’ slopes do
not change, but it shrinks it in volume. e volume is interpolated between 0, when θ is 0 and the
region is a single point — the center, and the original volume when θ is 1. e choice of the center
of shrinking is important, as it dictates the rate of change of the bias of the individual hyperplanes
— that is, how fast we cut additional volume in that direction. e choice of the median is dictated
by our desire to keep as many points of the original dataset of adversarial examples as possible in
the shrunken volume.
6 OUR FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our method in more formal terms. roughout the section we assume
a given ReLU-activated feedforward neural network f : Rn0 → Rnl with l − 1 layers of the form
fi (x) = max(0,Aix + bi ) and a nal layer fl (x) = Alx + bl , where fi : Rni−1 → Rni , Ai ∈ Rni×ni−1 ,
bi ∈ Rni for i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We also assume a given input image xo ∈ Rn0 to aack, classied
correctly by the network to label yc , an L-innity ball of radius ϵ around xo in which aacks are to
be searched, as well as a target adversarial label yt . Finally, our framework assumes an adversarial
aack algorithm α(xo ,yt , ϵ, s) that computes an adversarial aack contained in the ϵ L-innity ball
around xo for any given target class yt and random seed s . Our method is shown in Algorithm 1.
We dene a candidate adversarial region for x0 to be any input region P which is entirely
contained in the specied ϵ-ball and can be described by a set of m linear inequalitiesW x0 ≤ c,
with x0 ∈ Rn0 ,W ∈ Rm×n0 and c ∈ Rn0 . Our algorithm rst collects adversarial samples from α
to construct the initial set of positive samples D+0 of size s+ (Line 19-23), which are then used to
obtain an initial region P0 (Line 24). For a user-specied tmax ∈ Z, representing the maximum
number of half-space constraints we can use, we iteratively create candidate adversarial regions
P0 ⊃ P1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Ptmax . If a candidate region Pt with 0 ≤ t ≤ tmax is found that veriably
contains only adversarial examples, the algorithm returns Pi as the output. We use the function
Verify Region dened in Section 6.3 for this check.
Otherwise, we employ a heuristic to obtain a smaller veried region to
At every step t , the algorithm constructs the dataset of positive examples D+t for iteration t by
simply removing samples from D+0 that are not part of polyhedron Pt−1 computed at the previous
step (Line 31). Next, the algorithm chooses a method mt – either Frank-Wolfe (FW) or LP, via
the function choose method shown in Algorithm 2. e algorithm usesmt for rening Pt−1 using
Generate Region function also shown in Algorithm 1. e function collects a dataset of negative
samples D−t of size s− (Line 2-4) based on the worst-case adversarial example x∗t computed at
Line 2, the point x+t that is furthest away from it, in terms of L1 distance, computed at Line 3,
and the Gaussian sampling procedure to reduce the amount of incorrectly removed volume as per
eorem 2.4 described in Section 6.4 (Line 4). D−t is combined with negative samples from older
iterations stored inHt−1 to produce the negative sample datasetHt (Line 5). Finally, we use D+t
andHt , to t a binary linear classier ht (Line 6). ht is then added to the set of linear inequalities
of Pt−1 to form the next polyhedron in the sequence Pt . We next check if Pt contains only the
adversarial examples (Line 34). If yes, then the algorithm terminates otherwise it moves to the next
iteration. By eorem 2.6, it can happen that the volume removed by each linear classier decreases
with each iteration and is not sucient to obtain a veried region within the specied number of
maximum iterations. erefore, aer the maximum number of iterations tmax are reached and Pt
is still not proven to be adversarial then it is shrunk using the Shrink Region function dened in
Section 6.6 (Line 39).
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Algorithm 1 Symbolic adversarial example generation
1: function Generate Region(mt , Pt−1, s−, D+t )
2: x∗t = Find Worst Counter Example(Pt−1,mt )
3: x+t = argmaxx∈Pt−1 ( ‖x∗t − x‖1)
4: D−t = Gaussian Sample(x∗t , x+t ,s−)
5: Ht = Update History(D−t , Ht−1)
6: ht = Lin Classifier(Ht , D+t )
7: Pt = ht ∩ Pt−1
8: return Pt
9: end function
10:
11: function Compute Sym Adex(f , xo, yt , ϵ, s+, s−, p, α )
12: Parameters:
13: f : the neural network, xo : the input point for which we create the region
14: yt : the target class of the aack, ϵ : the radius of the Linf ball
15: s+ : number of aacks used to create original region
16: s− : number of negative samples used to create each individual hyperplane
17: p : number of iterations between change of method
18: α : an adversarial aack algorithm
19:
. compute the initial region P0
20: for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s+ } do
21: D+0 [i] = α (xo, yt , ϵ, si )
22: end for
23:
24: P0 = Get Init Region(D+0 )
25: if Verify Region(P0) then
26: return P0
27: end if
28: m0 = Choose Random(FW, LP), H0 = ∅
29:
. At each step t , compute the new dataset Dt and Pt
30: for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , tmax } do
31: D+t = Filter(D+0 , Pt−1)
32: mt = Choose Method(t,mt−1, Pt−1, D+t , p, s−)
33: Pt = Generate Region(mt , Pt−1, s−, D+t )
34: if Verify Region(Pt ) then
35: return Pt
36: end if
37: end for
38:
. Shrink Pt if it cannot be proved to be adversarial
39: P∗ = Shrink Region(Pt )
40: return P∗
41: end function
6.1 Computing an Initial Candidate Region
Before the rst iteration of our framework, we collect a dataset D+0 by invoking the algorithm α a
predetermined number of times with dierent seeds si . UsingD+0 we instantiate a candidate region
P0 by creating a set of interval constraints {min
a∈D+0
aj ≤ z0, j ≤ max
b∈D+0
bj } for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n0}. We
also initializem0 randomly to be either FW or LP andH0 = ∅.
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Algorithm 2 Choose Sampling Method
1: function Choose Method(t,mt−1, Pt−1, D+t , p, s−)
2: if t%p! = 0 then
3: returnmt−1
4: end if
5: o = O (Pt−1)
6:
. Compute score for Frank-Wolfe
7: t stFW = t ime(), PFW =Generate Region(FW , Pt−1, s−, D+t ), t enFW = t ime()
8: oFW = O (PFW ), sFW = o−oFWtenFW −t stFW
9:
. Compute score for LP
10: t stLP = t ime(), PLP = Generate Region(LP, Pt−1, s−, D+t ), t enLP = t ime()
11: oLP = O (PLP ), sLP = o−oLPtenLP −t stLP
12: if sLP < sFW then return LP
13: else return FW
14: end if
15: end function
6.2 Pruning the Candidate Regions
At each iteration t , we train a linear classierht dening the constraintwt ·z0 ≤ ct for some weights
wt and ct , to obtain Pt = ht ∩ Pt−1. To compute ht , two datasets are created — a counterexample
dataset D−t and an adversarial example dataset D+t . D+t is simply obtained by removing samples
fromD+0 that are not part of Pt−1 by calling the Filter method (Line 31). D−t is collected separately
for each Pt by the method described in Section 6.4.
e counterexamples collected in D−t can either be obtained via FW or LP. We use the heuristic
Choose Method function to periodically update the method for obtaining counterexamples with
a user-supplied period p. Its implementation is shown in Algorithm 2. It rst computes the LP
objective o over Pt−1. e computation of this LP objective is described in Section 6.3. e value
of the LP objective over the candidate polyhedra obtained using Frank-Wolfe and LP as well as
the runtime for obtaining them are recorded. We measure the improvement in LP objective by
subtracting the obtained objectives separately from o. e method with the higher ratio between
the improvement and runtime is then chosen.
For high dimensional input spaces, we empirically observe that sometimes the dierence in
the LP objective between two consecutive candidate regions Pt−1 and Pt gets small as t grows
large. We conjecture that this is due to a lack of diversity in the examples contained within D−t . To
alleviate the issue for high dimensional input spaces, we implement a counterexample history setHt
containing all the counterexamples in D−t−n , . . . ,D−t for a given history size n. In our experiments,
we use n = 5. e parameters wt , ct are then ed to the dataset (Ht ,D+t ). In our experiments, we
use logistic regression for obtaining ht , as we found it to perform beer for high dimensional data
than other alternatives such as support vector machines.
6.3 Verifying Candidate Regions
We now dene the workings of the Verify Region used in Algorithm 1. For each t ∈ {0, . . . , tmax},
we construct the triangle convex relaxation Tt of f for the input region Pt . We represent the
triangle relaxationTt in terms of the tuple (I ,A,R,T I ,TA,T R ), where I is a set of input LP variables,
A is a set of ane LP variables, R a set of ReLU LP variables andT I ,TA andT R are set of constraints
that dene the values that variables in I ,A and R can take. We denote the jth variable in I with z0, j .
We denote the jth ane LP variable on layer i with zai, j . We denote the jth ReLU LP variable on
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layer i with zri, j . We denote with TAi, j the set of constraints governing the value of zai, j . Similarly we
dene T Ri, j and T Ij . Equation 5 describes how these sets are computed with respect to Pt :
TAi, j (Pt ) = {zai, j = [bi ]j +
ni−1∑
k=1
[Ai ]j,k · zri−1,k }
TRi, j (Pt ) =

{zri, j = zai, j } , if minz0∈Pt (z
a
i, j ) ≥ 0
{zri, j = 0} , if maxz0∈Pt (z
a
i, j ) ≤ 0
{zri, j ≥ 0,
zri, j ≥ zai, j ,
zri, j ≤ λi, j · zai, j + µi, j }
, otherwise
T Ij (Pt ) = Pt
(5)
We dene TA(Pt ) as the union of the TAi, j (Pt ) for all i and j. Analogously, we also dene T I (Pt )
and T R (Pt ). At the end of each iteration, we use T (Pt ) in conjunction with an o-the-shelf LP
solver to compute the LP objective for Pt :
O(Pt ) = min
x ∈Pt
(zal,yt − zal, {1, ...,nl }\{yt }) (6)
If O(Pt ) ≥ 0 for some 0 ≤ t ≤ tmax, then we have proved that Pt is a symbolic adversarial example
and therefore we terminate our algorithm.
Optimization for computational gains. Naive computation of the triangle convex relaxation Tt
requires checking the properties max
z0∈Pt
(zai, j ) ≤ 0 and minz0∈Pt (z
a
i, j ) ≥ 0 for each zai, j ∈ A for each
k . is is computationally expensive. Since Pt ⊂ Pt−1, max
x0∈Pt−1
(zai, j ) ≤ 0 ⇒ maxx0∈Pt (z
a
i, j ) ≤ 0 and
min
x0∈Pt−1
(zai, j ) ≥ 0 ⇒ minx0∈Pt (z
a
i, j ) ≥ 0. is allows us to limit the computation of maxx0∈Pt (z
a
i, j ) and
min
x0∈Pt
(zai, j ) to only neurons for which minx0∈Pt−1(z
a
i, j ) < 0 and maxx0∈Pt−1(z
a
i, j ) > 0. at is, usually a small
subset of neurons allow for large computational gains.
6.4 Collecting Counterexamples
We dene the worst-case concrete counterexample for Pt−1, as a local minimum of
[f (x)]yt − [f (x)]{1, ...,nl }\{yt } (7)
in Pt−1, computed using the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We dene the worst-case abstract counterex-
ample for Pt−1, as the input for which the LP solver minimizes the verier objective O(Pt−1).
Depending on the type of methodmt chosen for collecting D−t via the Choose Method method, x∗ is
either the worst-case concrete or abstract counterexample.
Using the obtained x∗, an LP solver is used to compute x+ = argmaxx∈Pt−1 (‖x∗ − x‖1). Next, our
framework computes a predetermined number of equally-spaced points x∗i on the line segment
connecting x∗ and x+. For each x∗i , we collect samples from an isotropic Gaussian with covariance
ρ2i I centered at x∗i . Each sample generated from the Gaussians is tested for two conditions —
whether it is within Pt−1 and whether it is a counterexample. D−t is then assigned to the set of
Gaussian samples that pass both tests.
To determine if a Gaussian sample x is a concrete counterexample, we compute argmaxi [f (x)]i
and compare it toyt . Determining if x is an abstract counterexample is discussed in the next section.
For each individual Gaussian, ρ2i is determined using binary search, such that it is maximal and has
a counterexample success rate above a certain threshold.
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6.5 Approximate Abstract Counterexamples
To determine if a sample x generated by the Gaussian distributions is an abstract counterexample
in Pt−1, we need to check if the verier objective for Pt−1, under the additional constraint that
z0 = x, is negative. Exact computation of this verier objective is possible with an LP solver but is
computationally prohibitive to apply to each sample x individually. In this section, we discuss how
to approximate the calculation of the LP objective enabling fast abstract counterexample evaluation.
To compute this objective, the LP assigns values to the variables in A and R, such that zal,yt −
zal, {1, ...,nl }\{yt } is minimal. We dene numbers д
a
i, j and дri, j , which represent these optimal values
for zai, j and zri, j , respectively. We approximate дai, j and дri, j by values д˜ai, j and д˜ri, j . e computation
of д˜ai, j and д˜ri, j is based upon the values д∗ai, j and д∗ri, j assigned to the variables in A and R in Pt−1
while computing the worst-case abstract counterexample x∗. e values д˜ai, j and д˜ri, j are computed
layer by layer, starting with д˜a1, j for j ∈ {1, . . . ,nl }. Each д˜ai, j is computed by evaluating TAi, j using
the values assigned so far, as follows:
д˜ai, j = [bi ]j +
ni−1∑
k=1
[Ai ]j,k · д˜ri−1,k (8)
We compute д˜ri, j based on the set of constraints T Ri, j . If T Ri, j = {zri, j = zai, j }, we compute д˜ri, j = д˜ai, j .
Similarly, if T Ri, j = {zri, j = 0}, we compute д˜ri, j = 0. In the last case, observe that T Ri, j denes a
lower bound ˜lbi, j = max(0, д˜ai, j ) and an upper bound u˜bi, j = λi, jд˜ai, j + µi, j on д˜ri, j . Similarly,T Ri, j also
denes a lower bound lb∗i, j and an upper bound ub∗i, j on д∗ri, j and a lower bound lbi, j and an upper
bound ubi, j on дri, j . When computing дri, j , the LP solver is free to choose any value in [lbi, j , ubi, j ].
Similarly, in our approximation, we need to choose the value of д˜ri, j in [ ˜lbi, j , u˜bi, j ] but without
explicitly optimizing the objective. To do so, we mimic the decision taken by x∗ for this variable.
We dene d∗lbi, j = д∗ri, j − lb∗i, j and d∗ubi, j = ub∗i, j − д∗ri, j which represent distances from д∗ri, j to its lower
and upper bounds. We then compute д˜ri, j as a linear combination of these bounds:
д˜ri, j =
˜lbi, j ·
d∗ubi, j
d∗lbi, j + d
∗ub
i, j
+ u˜bi, j ·
d∗lbi, j
d∗lbi, j + d
∗ub
i, j
(9)
Samples for which the approximate evaluation achieves д˜al,yt − д˜al, {1, ...,nl }\{yt } < 0 are guaranteed
to be abstract counterexamples, however it does not provide any guarantees for samples x for
which zal,yt − zal, {1, ...,nl }\{yt } ≥ 0. is property of the approximate evaluation guarantees that
all samples collected in D−t are abstract counterexamples and thus need to be pruned out of the
candidate region Pt−1.
6.6 Shrinking the Candidate Region
We next dene the shrinking of the candidate regions which is used as a last resort to obtain
symbolic adversarial regions when such a region cannot be obtained within tmax iterations. Given a
candidate region Pt , dened by the set ofm inequalitiesW x0 ≤ c, the shrinking algorithm seeks to
choose a new set of biases c∗ ≤ c such that the resulting region S∗ can be proven to be adversarial.
e algorithm selects a center xc ∈ Rn0 based on a coordinate-wise median of the samples in D+t .
It then calculates the distances from xc to each line in Pt given by di = |
∑n0
k=1[W ]i,k ·[xc ]k−[c]i |
‖Wi ‖2 for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For a given θ ∈ [0, 1], we dene [c∗]i = [c]i − θ · di · ‖Wi ‖2. Here, θ interpolates
between the original region Pt at θ = 0 and a region only containing xc at θ = 1. Finally, S∗ is
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chosen via binary search on θ . We next try to verify S∗ via the Verify Region function, if it fails
then the above procedure is repeated.
6.7 Replacing Triangle with DeepPoly
So far, we have discussed how to use the triangle convex relaxation to verify candidate regions
and generate abstract counterexamples. We can also use the coarser DeepPoly relaxation, which
can signicantly improve the scalability of our approach. We now discuss how we have extended
the algorithm to the DeepPoly convex relaxation. Using DeepPoly allows us to scale our methods
to bigger networks in exchange for lower verication precision of symbolic adversarial regions.
DeepPoly is a further relaxation of the triangle approximation and as such the algorithms presented
here trivially extend to DeepPoly by modifying the triangle relaxation encoding Tt . However, a
major factor in the speedup provided by DeepPoly is that it is able to substitute the expensive
LP encoding of the neural network Tt and to solve the optimization problems involved in the
verication process with direct backsubstitution. erefore, we modied our algorithm to take
advantage of this backsubstitution property. e original DeepPoly paper (Singh et al. 2019)
describes the backsubstitution algorithm in the case of an input region that is a box. To make
it applicable in our seing, we extend the backsubstitution algorithm to allow for general linear
inequalities over the input. We do that by terminating the backsubstitution at the input layer to
obtain a lower bound and an upper bound of the form c +
n0∑
k=1
wk · x0,k for each neuron. LPs of
the form min
x0∈Pt
(c +
n0∑
k=1
wk · x0,k ) are then constructed in order to compute the lower bounds of
every neuron. Analogously, another set of LPs is constructed to compute the upper bounds. e
procedure is ecient since the LPs involved in the process contain only n0 variables and a small
number of constraints.
In addition to adapting the verication process itself, we also need to adapt the abstract coun-
terexample evaluation algorithm outlined in Section 6.5. However, the abstract counterexample
evaluation can be viewed as an application of the verication process on a box which contains
exactly one point — the sample, and thus it is eciently computed via backsubstitution. To share
computation between multiple samples, the backsubstitution can also be precomputed until the
input layer, with individual samples being substituted in the resulting linear expression.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now evaluate the eectiveness of our approach on realistic networks. We compare our frame-
work to Polaris (Zhang et al. 2018), the closest related work, and show that our method scales to
larger networks with high-dimensional inputs, while generating regions with large volume.
We implemented our framework in Python and used Tensorow (Abadi et al. 2015) and Clever-
Hans (Papernot et al. 2018) for generating PGD aacks. We use Gurobi 8.0 (Gurobi Optimization,
LLC 2020) for solving LP instances. We rely on Scikit-learn for the logistic regression and ELINA
(Singh et al. 2019) for its DeepPoly convex relaxation (Singh et al. 2019).
Datasets: We use the standard MNIST (LeCun et al. 1998) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky 2009)
datasets, as well as the mortgage dataset from Fannie Mae (2017) used by Zhang et al. (2018). e
MNIST dataset has grayscale images of size 28 × 28 pixels. e CIFAR10 dataset has RGB images of
size 32×32×3. Records in the mortgage dataset consists of 9 categorical features and 12 real-valued
features describing the nancial information of individuals that were granted a mortgage loan and
whether they paid it back.
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Table 1. Neural networks used in our experiments.
Dataset Model Type Neurons Layers
MNIST
8 × 200 FFN 1,610 9
ConvSmall CONV 3,604 3
ConvBig CONV 48,064 6
CIFAR10 ConvSmall CONV 4,852 3
Mortgage 5 × 200 FFN 1,002 5
Table 2. Polaris vs. our framework with DeepPoly and the triangle relaxations on the mortgage dataset.
Metric Polaris DeepPoly Triangle
AvgTime (s) 329 105 396
MedArea 7.9 7.3 16.5
Neural Networks: Table 1 shows the sizes and types of dierent neural networks we use in
our experiments. e network used for the mortgage experiments is taken from Zhang et al. (2018).
Remaining networks are taken from Singh et al. (2019). None of the networks are adversarially
trained, to allow us to run PGD aacks on them. Our deepest network is the MNIST 8 × 200
fully-connected network (FFN) which has 8 layers with 200 neurons each and another layer with
10 neurons. Our largest network is the MNIST ConvBig network with 6 layers and 48K neurons.
Experimental Setup: We ran all our experiments on a 2.2 GHz 12 core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2650
with 64 GB of RAM.
7.1 Mortgage Dataset Experiments
Table 2 compares the average time taken (AvgTime) and the median area (MedArea) of the regions
on 20 dierent mortgage samples between Polaris and our framework instantiated with two dierent
certication methods – DeepPoly and the triangle relaxation. We used the 5 × 200 fully connected
network (FFN) trained by Zhang et al. (2018). We mimic the evaluation setup of Polaris where 2-D
regions based on the Loan-to-Value (LTV) and InterestValue features in the dataset are generated.
e low dimensionality enables us to calculate areas exactly. Our framework requires an input
regions S0 to start pruning, which we cannot obtain in the non-adversarial Polaris seing. As an
alternative to estimating S0, we feed our framework with an overapproximation box containing all
linear regions Polaris obtains for the given input. We additionally enlarge that box by 5% in each
direction to ensure further pruning of S0 is required. We compare the convex underapproximation
Polaris uses for convexifying its nal regions with regions pruned by our algorithm. Table 2 shows
that our framework using the triangle ReLU approximation creates 2x larger regions than Polaris
while being only slightly slower. Table 2 also shows that our framework using the less precise
DeepPoly relaxation is 3x faster than Polaris while creating regions that are only slightly smaller.
7.2 MNIST and CIFAR10 Dataset Experiments
Table 3 summarizes the results of our experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. For both,
we ran our framework on the rst 100 test images, while ltering the wrongly-classied ones. In
all experiments, we collect 5000 adversarial examples from both PGD and Frank-Wolfe, initialized
with dierent seeds for computing P0. e samples are collected within an L∞ ball around a test
image with the radius ϵ specied in Table 3. We refer to this as our initial aack method α . All
experiments in Table 3 use DeepPoly. Further, all experiments use logistic regression with a class
Scalable Inference of Symbolic Adversarial Examples 1:21
Table 3. Results of our MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset experiments.
Dataset Model ϵ tmax Over Under #Regions #Images #Failures Time
MNIST
8 × 200 0.045 30 10147 1052 51 30 5 783s
ConvSmall 0.12 50 10441 10258 64 35 0 399s
ConvBig 0.05 30 10115 1079 12 9 5 4310s
CIFAR10 ConvSmall 0.01 30 10458 10265 43 22 11 297s
bias weighing counterexamples 100 times more than the adversarial examples so to enable more
volume pruning at each iteration.
We dene the overapproximation box of a symbolic region as the box generated by the minimum
and maximum values of each individual pixel. is box overapproximates the real volume of the
region. Similarly, an underapproximation box of a symbolic region gives a lower bound on the
region’s volume. We follow the procedure outlined by Gopinath et al. (2019) to compute it. Using
these two notions, we calculate the size of a symbolic adversarial example as the number of concrete
adversarial examples contained within these two boxes. ese are calculated as the number of
dierent discrete values each pixel in the boxes can take.
For each network, in Table 3, we present the number of distinct pairs of an image and a target
(xo ,yt ) on which α succeeds (column #Regions), as well as the number of unique images on which
α succeeds (column #Images). Table 3 also details the number of regions where our framework fails,
that is it nds a symbolic adversarial example whose underapproximation box contains less than
the 10000 concrete adversarial examples sampled with α initially. Finally, we report the average
running time for the discovered regions, as well as the volume of their median underapproximation
and overapproximation boxes. As can be seen, our framework creates symbolic regions with 10258
and 10265 concrete examples in the underapproximated box on the MNIST and CIFAR10 ConvSmall
networks in ≤ 7 minutes on average.
Next, we compare our framework to Polaris on the MNIST ConvSmall network. As the imple-
mentation by Zhang et al. (2018) does not support convolutional layers, we re-implemented Polaris
using ERAN (Singh et al. 2018) and Gurobi (Gurobi Optimization, LLC 2020). We adapt Polaris
to search for symbolic adversarial examples by applying its Algorithm 2 on a PGD aack and
then adding the LP constraint that the input variables need to be within an ϵ-ball around the
original image x0 to the appropriate LP instances. Polaris creates a predetermined number of linear
regions based on activation paerns of neurons which are then summarized with a single convex
region that underapproximates their union. e algorithms in Polaris for generating the convex
underapproximations scale poorly with input dimensionality. Consequently, we do not compare
our symbolic examples with these underapproximation regions but directly with the union of
individual linear regions collected by Polaris which is the most scalable way of generating regions
with Polaris on the image domain.
We compute results for Polaris based on the rst 25 MNIST test images for which a PGD aack
with ϵ = 0.12 was found. For these images, we generated up to 100 activation regions. For each
region, we computed its respective overapproximation and underapproximation boxes. ese were
then summed over all activation regions retrieved by Polaris, to obtain the nal count which is
computed as 100. e results show that the actual volume computed via Polaris is much smaller
than that of the regions obtained via our framework, as demonstrated by the small number of
concrete adversarial examples in the underapproximation boxes.
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Table 4. Eects of neural network architecture on symbolic adversarial examples
Model Time Cuts Initial Box Over Under
2 × 50 88s 1 10285 10285 10285
2 × 100 2409s 63 10232 10232 10108
5 × 100 6280s 71 10334 10334 1088
7.3 Eectiveness of the Gaussian Sampling
We compare our Gaussian sampling heuristic for obtaining counterexamples, against the simple
random uniform sampling on the initial hyperbox region P0, for a single MNIST image on the
5 × 100 FFN presented in Singh et al. (2019).
Aer uniformly sampling 100000 samples on P0 and evaluating them on the network, we failed to
nd a single counter example and, thus failed to cut any volume from P0. In contrast, our sampling
nds 4601 samples, which allowed our method to obtain a region aer 5 cuts. is behavior of
uniform sampling is consistent with our observations on dierent high-dimensional input spaces.
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Fig. 7. Sensitivity of symbolic adversarial examples on the MNIST ConvBig network.
7.4 Dependence on the Neural Network Architecture
In the next section, we explore the eect of the neural network’s architecture on the process
of creating symbolic adversarial examples. In particular, we compare the symbolic adversarial
examples created on 3 FNNs – 2 × 50, 2 × 100 and 5 × 100 from Singh et al. (2019) on the same
MNIST image (6th test image), the same adversarial target (8) and the same ϵ = 0.05. We explicitly
disabled shrinking for this experiment to observe the full complexity of the problem of cuing the
volume. Table 4 summarizes the results. We see that, as the size of the network increases, so does
the number of cuts required. We conjecture this is due to the ner partition of the input space
created by the network. In particular, the size of the partition grows exponentially with the number
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Fig. 8. Sensitivity of symbolic adversarial examples on the MNIST ConvSmall network.
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Fig. 9. Sensitivity of symbolic adversarial examples on the MNIST 8 × 200 network.
of neurons. us, the input space is partitioned into much smaller chunks, which in turn prevents
bigger robust adversarial regions. We also note that the underapproximating volumes of 5× 100 are
particularly low. We conjecture this is caused by more complex non-convex decision boundaries
associated with the increase in depth.
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Fig. 10. Sensitivity of symbolic adversarial examples on the CIFAR10 ConvSmall network. For each subfigure
we show from le to right: the original image and the sensitivity in the red, blue and green channel respectively.
8 VISUALISING OUR RESULTS
In this section we show a subset of the symbolic adversarial examples we have obtained for the
dierent neural networks described in Section 7 (Figures 7-10). For all images, colorbars signify
how much individual pixel values can change within the underapproximation boxes calculated
for the symbolic adversarial examples (out of 256). e pixel colors have the same meaning as
in Figure 1. In all gures we show the original test image alongside with the sensitivity image,
with the CIFAR10 gure showing a sensitivity image for each color channel separately. We notice
common paerns between the adversarial examples obtained for the MNIST networks, where the
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background pixels, particularly those on the edges, are green and thus can take several values
within our underapproximation boxes. We also see that many foreground pixels are yellow and thus
their intensity can vary the highest. For the symbolic adversarial examples obtained on CIFAR10
ConvSmall (Figure 10) we notice a common paern where the symbolic adversarial examples are
invariant to the values of pixels on the boom rows and right columns. ere are few foreground
pixels that are also yellow. is is a paern we observed on most symbolic adversarial examples
obtained on this network.
Based on our results for both MNIST and CIFAR10 networks, we conclude that our obtained
regions are robust and can capture adversarial examples generated by variations caused when
transferring a synthesized adversarial example in real-world conditions.
9 RELATEDWORK
e work of Dathathri et al. (2019) uses symbolic interpolation to compute both an under- and an
overapproximation of the set of inputs for which a given output property holds. e work of Zhang
et al. (2018) explores linear regions specied by the activation paerns of neurons in the network.
e regions with dierent activation paerns are then combined to obtain a nal symbolic region.
e work of Gopinath et al. (2019) is also based on similar techniques as Zhang et al. (2018). We
note that these works do not scale to the larger MNIST and CIFAR10 neural networks used in our
experiments. In contrast, our symbolic inference method scales to larger networks and can also be
used to address the problems investigated by these works in a more scalable manner.
e work of (Athalye et al. 2018; Kurakin et al. 2016) aims to create adversarial examples that
can be reproduced in the real-world. However, both do not generate any continuous region like
our work and instead try to nd a single adversarial image whose neighbors are likely adversarial.
e work of (Gulshad and Smeulders 2020; Hsieh et al. 2020) utilize adversarial examples for
generating feature-based explanations of neural networks. We note that our regions can also
produce similar explanations.
10 CONCLUSION
We introduced the concept of a symbolic adversarial example, a convex region containing a large
set of concrete adversarial examples. We presented a theoretical analysis showing that the problem
of computing optimal symbolic adversarial examples is hard. We presented a scalable method
for synthesizing an approximation of the optimal symbolic regions: the method iteratively adds
half-space constraints to an initial box region until the region is proved to be adversarial. Our
evaluation shows the method scales to larger networks while computing wide regions (10258
concrete adversarial examples) that can be used for producing real-world adversarial examples.
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